This is what I just wrote for a philosophy class I am in, the prompt is to write a proof of existence. I thought I would double dip and add this to my blog.
Does reality exist? Really? Really, really? This is the question that René Descartes asks us in the beginning of his work Meditations on First Philosophy. He attempts to draw everything into doubt – every aspect of what we conceive to be reality. He then wants to move us from this realm of absolute skepticism to a realm of extreme certainty. The first aspect of our reality he attempts to confirm is that we exist. This he does fairly successfully. He establishes that the subject that draws things into doubt, thought, cannot also be the object of that doubt. We must exist because we are thinking beings, and thus either receive or create thought. But regardless there must be something that thought exists within. It was when he attempted to prove a reality external to the thinker that he ran into trouble, and developed viewpoints that many philosophers after him have picked apart. But the question still exists, how do we bridge this gap, the one that exists between what Descartes has confirmed as the “I” or the thinker that exists, and the external reality that the thinker perceives? The answer is through a search into what is intrinsic to how human’s formulate the world and what is extrinsic to it. If we can prove that objects that are extrinsic to human consciousness, or to our thinking process, help to shape those processes, then there must at least be minimally a “something” that is doing the shaping that goes beyond the thinker that develops ideas.
Does reality exist? Really? Really, really? This is the question that René Descartes asks us in the beginning of his work Meditations on First Philosophy. He attempts to draw everything into doubt – every aspect of what we conceive to be reality. He then wants to move us from this realm of absolute skepticism to a realm of extreme certainty. The first aspect of our reality he attempts to confirm is that we exist. This he does fairly successfully. He establishes that the subject that draws things into doubt, thought, cannot also be the object of that doubt. We must exist because we are thinking beings, and thus either receive or create thought. But regardless there must be something that thought exists within. It was when he attempted to prove a reality external to the thinker that he ran into trouble, and developed viewpoints that many philosophers after him have picked apart. But the question still exists, how do we bridge this gap, the one that exists between what Descartes has confirmed as the “I” or the thinker that exists, and the external reality that the thinker perceives? The answer is through a search into what is intrinsic to how human’s formulate the world and what is extrinsic to it. If we can prove that objects that are extrinsic to human consciousness, or to our thinking process, help to shape those processes, then there must at least be minimally a “something” that is doing the shaping that goes beyond the thinker that develops ideas.
Descartes attempts to prove that there is nothing extrinsic to our consciousness when he argues that the “finite” nature of human beings makes it so that we can create other objects that are finite. He states that the “chief and most common mistake which is to be found here consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things located outside me” (26). This is to suggest that there is no reason to believe that there is anything that exists outside of the self. We cannot know that the ideas formed from our perception of external events necessarily present themselves from those external events or from some aspect of our own consciousness. He then, in his attempt to prove that there is a g-d, argues that “if the objective reality of my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same reality does not reside in me…it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some other thing which is the cause of the idea also exists” (29). Thus, in order for something to exist it has to possess characteristics that could not exist within the reality of those who perceive the existence of that object, or formulate an idea of it. It has to be qualitatively extrinsic to the individual who perceives it in order for it to definitely be real, since in that way the individual cannot manufacture it from him or herself. Descartes argues that there are few things that can even be perceived clearly at all, and of these things all of them such as “substance, duration, number,” and one can perceive a stone from the knowledge that both the “I” and the “stone” are a substance (30). G-d exists because g-d possesses qualities that we do not, namely that g-d is “infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful” which are characteristics that cannot be accounted for since Descartes is a “finite substance,” whereas g-d is infinite (31). Thus, g-d, uniquely, amongst any possible idea cannot derive from the thinker since it is characteristically extrinsic to the individual.
Descartes here, though, seems to create too broad generalization when he says that just because something is finite it can derive other finite substances intrinsically. The classic and very compelling example of this is that of the person who is born blind. The person who is blind cannot derive colored objects solely because he is finite and the colored objects he perceives are also finite. The only conception that they can have is of objects themselves. This means that there is a characteristic (namely that of color) perceived by one group of people and another group of people do not perceive that characteristic and it changes the way both groups perceive reality. As a result, there must be something that exists externally, that changes the way that we formulate ideas of things internally, an extrinsic reality that shapes our internal manner of thinking of things.
However, this does not seem to fully escape Descartes argument, because Descartes argues that we cannot properly perceive the objects that we think we perceive (14). The blind man would then become an example in Descartes favor, because it seems to suggest someone who perceives something that has characteristics not perceived by the perceiver. This is to say, then, that the perceptions we have of external events could be incorrect because we could miss out on something that is qualitatively true. Consequently, we cannot trust our senses as accurate preceptors of day to day life. The fallacy here though is the idea that because we perceive the events or objects around us incorrectly they consequently do not exist. This is false because the incorrect perception of something does not negate the fact that there is something that is perceived. We then return to the blind man example above. Even though the blind man perceived the object that he sensed incorrectly, or, more accurately, not totally correctly, the blind man perceived an object that does exist and can be “confirmed” by the senses of someone who is not blind. Of course, the senses of those who are not blind may also give the viewer an incorrect message. The main point here is that even though our perceptions may be off, it does not mean that we do not perceive something that truly exists. Even in the case of dreams or a mirage we must have had to, at some point, perceive external objects that allow us to formulate the image of some reality. Otherwise we would not have the pieces to put the dream or mirage together mentally.
This concession that we could perceive all of reality falsely takes us to a point of doubt where we cannot take for granted the necessary pre-requisite for the blind man argument: that these characteristics are not some way intrinsically part of us and naturally perceived, and thus are intrinsic rather than extrinsic. If we choose not to trust our senses, we could be multi-colored blobs floating in ether that perceive ourselves unconsciously but still perceive the building blocks that formulate our reality. If one is blind it is because they are a blob that lacks a particular type of natural self-perception. We are thus still stuck since we have yet to prove that anything we perceive is necessarily extrinsic to properties of the self. So now we must examine what aspects of the self we can ascertain.
Assuming that the substance that we consist of is finite, then we have to search for something else extrinsic to the intrinsic nature of a finite being. A finite being, as a part of its nature, must be individuated from others. Because it is finite it necessarily cannot extend infinitely. A finite being could be the only finite being within a void of infinite space. However, at some point it has edges that cut it off from extension. If this finite being was a finite being within a void, with no external reality, only possessing the atomic reality contained in itself then it could not conceive of symbolic concepts that are external to itself. Because a finite substance is one unit, it could not conceptualize partaking in the experience of other units. For example, concepts such as collectivism and solidarity are concepts that exist necessarily because of other finite beings that exist beyond the thinker. These concepts are extrinsic to the thinker’s nature but also shape the thinker’s thinking. If one was only one, then one could not imagine being one of many. Feeling like part of a collective experience would be impossible, because one would only understand the experience of individuality.
Now let us assume that the thinker is an infinite being, the false perception that allows this assumption being that we are finite. If we assume that the characteristics of infinitude are the opposite of finitude (namely that we are undifferentiated from others) then it would be impossible to conceptualize individualism. To imagine being cut off from someone else would not make sense because the experience of the infinite thinker multi-colored blob would be inherently that of collectivity. However, infinity is so broad that we cannot assume that it is just the opposite of finitude. Because infinity could also be taken to mean “inclusive of all concepts” in which case the concept of individualism would be included within the infinite perception of every permutation of relationships between objects that could possibly exist. Descartes argues when he attempts to prove we cannot produce the idea of g-d that the thinker cannot know everything, so infinity is extrinsic to our nature (32). Consequently, the thinker cannot be a perfect infinite being. However, this adds a new factor into the equation that was not there initially, namely that something infinite must necessarily understand every aspect of its infinite nature. All we need to prove here, in order to prove that our understanding of an “external” reality really comes from a “self,” is that the characteristics by which one develops one’s reality are intrinsic to one’s nature and that there is some perception of that nature that happens. It is not a necessary pre-requisite that we have to consciously register everything that exists within our consciousness; the thinker would just have to have some perception of these atomic building blocks of “reality” in order to re-arrange them in some ordered way.
It seems though that there are still at least some forms of external consciousness that deliver reality to the individual. The seemingly finite thinker still needs to be introduced to the idea of “collectivity” even if that thinker is really infinite. Consequently, it seems like every consciousnesses within the infinite thinker would be an offshoot of the same “consciousness” or collective knowledge. Just like different neurons of the same brain. Each holding, or helping to transmit information. In that way the entirety of reality would be that of the infinite thinker, and “existence” would be the process by which information was transmitted within the substance of the thinker. One could argue though that in order to fulfill the requirements of infinity, infinity would have to include every permutation of possibly realities, which necessarily includes the possibility of multiple infinities as well as finitude. However, in order to prove that these separate infinities existed externally to the initial infinity-substance one would necessarily have to limit its infinitely expansive nature. In which case infinity would overlap and exist within infinity infinitely, and at that point becomes redundant. However, the concept of “finitude” explains why the infinite information within an infinite being would need to be divided. It would necessarily have to be moved into beings that are not infinitely expansive or knowledgeable.
Thus we are left with two options: we are either finite beings within an external reality or we are offshoots of an infinite thinker that divides itself into strands. There is no obvious reason to favor one of these explanations over the other. However, regardless of which one of these two explanations of the nature of our being is true, we know there has to be an existence at least relativistically external to our individuated consciousness. Because infinity must include finitude, there must be some beings that exist, in a sense, external to our particular strand of existence within the infinite thinker. Thus there is an “external” existence even if it just external to our particular strand. If the thinker is a finite being, then it learns concepts that can only exist due to the existence of beings outside of itself. Ultimately, in both these cases it seems that we know there is an external existence because of the fact that there is a social existence that allows us to experience other forms of consciousness that an individuated singularity could not. The infinite permutations and ideas that can result due to human interaction are able to shape our consciousness extrinsically. Consequently, they allow us to know that something external to the self exists purely because beings exist who populate that space, formulate ideas with us and ultimately shape us in ways that we could not possibly shape ourselves.
Works citedDescartes, René, and Bernard Arthur. Meditations on first philosophy: with selections from the Objections and replies. Cambridge Univ Pr, 1996. Print.
Works citedDescartes, René, and Bernard Arthur. Meditations on first philosophy: with selections from the Objections and replies. Cambridge Univ Pr, 1996. Print.
